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The Concile National of :
Napoleon, Gallicanism and the
Failure of Neo-Conciliarism
by AMBROGIO A. CAIANI
University of Kent
E-mail: a.a.caiani@kent.ac.uk
The concile national of  was one of the greatest ﬂashpoints in the struggle that pitted
the Napoleonic Empire against the papacy. This episode, which deserves to be situated within
more recent historiographical trends, reveals much about the nature of Napoleonic imperialism
and the Church’s distrust for the power of the state. This article puts forward the view that the
failure of the concile national was not strategic but tactical. Several bishops were frustrated
with the pope’s recalcitrance over episcopal investiture and fearful of schism. But their initial
openness to neo-conciliarism turned to hostility when confronted with the state’s intolerance.
T he most unintended outcome of the Revolutionary and Napoleonicdecades was the strengthening of the papacy and its Ultramontaneideology. Of all the forces that resisted French ‘cultural imperial-
ism’ the most successful and relentless in its refusal to acquiesce was the
Church of Rome. This phenomenon, which Michael Broers has called
the ‘War against God’, reached a signiﬁcant crisis point in . On the
surface it seemed as if the Napoleonic behemoth had conquered Europe
and now commanded universal obedience. Yet the behaviour of the
AN = Archives nationales, Paris; ASMi = Archivio di Stato di Milano. All translations
from the French are the author’s own.
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clergy in the French imperium betrayed just how much dissent and anger
lurked beneath apparently placid waters. Empire and Religion did not
operate in harmony and conﬂicts over ultimate control of the Church
were the norm.
This was especially the case in the Napoleonic Empire and its struggle
with the papacy over episcopal appointments within those territories that
fell under its control. The concile national of  was one of the key ﬂash-
points in this struggle for supremacy. This episode reveals much about the
nature of Napoleonic imperialism and the Church’s distrust of the growing
power of the bureaucratic state. French Catholic historiography lavished
attention on the concile during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, but its assessments were deeply entangled in the context in which
they were written. The growing conﬂict over the occupation of Rome in
 and the separation of Church from State in  created a siege
mentality among church historians. Catholic aristocrats and scholarly cler-
gymen drew clear parallels between their anti-clerical present and the
Napoleonic past. They charted an impressive genealogy of anti-Catholic
persecution that cast a long shadow into their republican present.
Studies by the comte d’Haussonville, the comte Mayol de Lupé and the
abbé Ricard are admirable in their erudition. These antiquarians had
access to minutes, journals and notes whose location today is uncertain.
The Archives départementales du Rhône hold the lion’s share of the
papers of Napoleon’s uncle, Cardinal Joseph Fesch, archbishop of Lyons,
but his minutes on the concile of  and the diary of Maurice de
Broglie, bishop of Ghent, are difﬁcult to locate. Fortunately the content
of these vital documents is substantially reproduced in the studies by the
comte d’Haussonville and the abbé Ricard published during the s.
This article also refers to the journal kept by the canonico Alberto Rossetti
during the concile, and published by the cathedral chapter of Venice in
. This is a vital source that throws light on the attitudes of the
Italian-born bishops from the satellite kingdom of Italy who attended the
concile. It appears not to have been cited in previous studies. Otherwise
the bulk of the archival material consulted for this article emanates from
the Archives nationales in Paris and the Archivio di Stato in Milan. The
thousands of manuscript pages in Paris, although known to historians,
 J. O. de Cléron, comte d’Haussonville, L’Église romaine et le Premier Empire, –
, Paris –; M. E. H. comte de Mayol de Lupé, La Captivité de Pie VII:
d’après des documents inédits, Paris ; A. Ricard, Le Concile national de , Paris .
 A. Rossetti, Giornale, ossia memorie relative al Concilio Nazionale convocato in Parigi colla
circolare dell’Imperatore e Re Napoleone  aprile , Venice .
 The summons, orders and travel arrangements for the bishops of the Napoleonic
kingdom of Italy are to be found in ASMi, atti di governo, culto parte moderna .
 AMBROG IO A . CA IAN I
have not been systematically sifted. Indeed, much interesting material has
lain dormant and unappreciated.
Since the First World War, historical scholarship has tended to lose sight
of the concile of . Notable exceptions include Bernard Plongeron’s
Résistances religieuses à Napoléon and, more recently, a collection of essays
edited by Jacques-Olivier Boudon. These studies have identiﬁed the
concile as a turning-point in the religion crisis that confronted Napoleon’s
Grand Empire and its ecclesiastical culture. The French imperium’s absolute
insistence on the supremacy of lay government over the Catholic hierarchy
was too bitter a pill for the early nineteenth-century Church to swallow. The
emperor completely under-estimated the resolve of the clergy. As the late
Geoffrey Ellis reminds us, for the Voltairian Napoleon, religion was a utili-
tarian exercise. For him, the clergy reinforced the moral authority of the
imperial government, allowing it to impose taxes and conscript its subjects
with divinely sanctioned legitimacy.
On the other side of this divide lay a papacy that could not accept such
subservience. The pope could neither accept subordination nor equality
with other faiths or Christian denominations. The law codes promulgated
during the consulate struck at the heart of the Catholic culture of the
family. As Michael Broers has demonstrated effectively, for the
départements réunis, a signiﬁcant proportion of the population (especially
at the base of the social pyramid) tended to side with the Church when
faced with modernisation and reform. The parish seemed a natural
bulwark for the community against the social disaggregation that was threa-
tened by the intrusive Napoleonic state. This article argues that the concile
will be better understood if it is integrated within these fresh historiograph-
ical trajectories. Previous studies painted the Church’s survival and liber-
ation from Napoleon’s Babylonian captivity as providential. To picture
this episode as a battle between good and evil is not particularly helpful.
Through new archival sources and unexploited published materials, this
article argues that the concile’s failure was not pre-ordained, but the fruit
of miscalculation and a striking failure of diplomacy on the part of the
French imperial administration.
 B. Plongeron, Des Résistances religieuses à Napoléon, –, Paris , –;
J.-O. Boudon and R. Hême de Lacotte (eds), La Crise concordataire: Catholiques français et
italiens entre Pie VII et Napoléon, –, Paris , esp. B. Plongeron, ‘Napoléon et
la crise religieuse, –: radioscopie d’un échec’, at pp. –; S. Hermann de
Franceschi, ‘Le Spectre de Bossuet et des quatre articles de : reviviscence d’une
référence gallicane au temps de l’affrontement entre Pie VII et Napoléon Ier’, at
pp. –; and R. Hême de la Lacotte, ‘De la Faveur à la fronde: la grande
aumônerie Napoléon et l’échec du concile de ’, at pp. –.
 G. Ellis, ‘Religion according to Napoleon: the limitations of pragmatism’, in
N. Aston (ed.), Religious changes in Europe, –, London , –.
 Broers, Politics of religion, ch. iv.
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The late Emile Perreau-Saussine highlighted that Catholicism’s grudg-
ing acceptance of the ‘political modernity’ unleashed by the French
Revolution, and internationalised by the Napoleonic Empire, was anything
but a linear process. It was ﬁtful, characterised by myriad misunderstand-
ings and false starts. Those who had signed the Concordat of  had
done so in the expectation that they would receive a more favourable com-
promise in the future. The organic laws, the Italian Concordat of 
and Pius VII’s visit to Paris to crown the emperor in  highlighted the
worsening relationship between Church and State. By  events spir-
alled out of control, as French imperial administrators assumed that they
could simply impose the concordat and reorganise the ecclesiastical admin-
istration in newly conquered territories with little or no consultation with
the pope. The point of no return in this process was reached when
Pius VII was arrested indecorously on  July  and imprisoned in
Savona for almost three years. Six hundred Roman priests who refused
to swear loyalty to the French were deported to Corsica. More unprece-
dented still was the detention of those thirteen cardinals who failed to
attend the emperor’s wedding to the Archduchess Marie-Louise. They
were stripped of their pontiﬁcal robes and became the deﬁant black cardi-
nals of the imperial gaols. As a sign that Paris was the new Rome, the
Vatican archives were shipped to the French capital.
Throughout this crisis the papacy responded in time-honoured fashion
by refusing to collaborate with hostile forces. Its ultimate displeasure was
made manifest when the emperor and his administration were excommu-
nicated. Thus the road was opened for mass civil disobedience. The
Concordat of , like that of Bologna in , had recognised the
 E. Perreau-Saussine, Catholicism and democracy, Princeton, NJ , esp. chs i, ii.
 W. Roberts, ‘Napoleon, the Concordat of , and its consequences’, in F. Coppa
(ed.), Controversial concordats: the Vatican’s relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler,
Washington, DC , –.
 A. Theiner, Histoire des deux concordats, Paris , ii/, chs ii–iii; ii/, ch. x. More
broadly see J. McManners, The French Revolution and the Church, London , –,
and S. Desan, ‘The French Revolution and religion, –’, in S. Brown and
T. Tackett (eds), The Cambridge history of Christianity, VII: Enlightenment, reawakening
and revolution, –, Cambridge , –.
 Napoleon to Pius VII, Paris,  février , in Fondation Napoléon, Napoléon
Bonaparte: correspondance générale, Paris –, vi, no. , at pp. –.
 Mayol de Lupé, La Captivité de Pie VII, passim; E. E. Y. Hales, The emperor and the
pope, New York , passim.
 J. Destrem, ‘Déportations de prêtres sous le Premier Empire’, Revue historique xi/
(), –.
 U. Beseghi, I tredici Cardinali Neri, Florence , passim; C. A. de Grandmaison,
Napoléon et les cardinaux noirs, –, Paris , passim.
 V. Bindel, Le Vatican à Paris, Paris , –.
 B. Melchior-Bonnet, Napoléon et le pape, Paris , –.
 Broers, Politics of religion, ch. vi.
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monarch’s right to appoint bishops to vacant dioceses. Throughout the
years from  to  no papal bulls were issued to conﬁrm imperial
nominees. A new investiture crisis, reminiscent of the struggle that had
pitted Henry IV against Gregory VII in the eleventh century, was building.
By  the Church faced one of its worst crises since the great medieval
schism which had straddled the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries.
The papacy’s refusal to negotiate, let alone invest new bishops, left only
one solution open to the imperial administration: namely a recourse to
neo-conciliarist measures. Simply put, the French Empire resurrected the
late medieval notion that church councils could circumvent papal suprem-
acy. Many historians have seen this process as a cynical exercise by
Napoleon to force his will on the Catholic Church. While there is some
truth in this assessment, it can rather be argued that the appeal to conciliar-
ism was not entirely misguided. Through this expedient, the Empire sought
to appeal to older members of the Catholic hierarchy in France who had
lived through the twilight years of Gallicanism and Jansenist controversies
over ecclesiology during the second half of the eighteenth century.
Historians of conciliarism have focused on Jansenism and Febronianism
and have disregarded its swansong during the early nineteenth century.
For example, Francis Oakley’s brilliant The conciliarist tradition passes over
the events of  in complete silence. This article contends that neo-
conciliarist thinking, even if clumsily articulated, was central to the concile.
The Napoleonic regime’s relationship with the French Church’s
Gallican inheritance was complex. The eighteenth century had witnessed
a great intellectual ferment with regard to the structure of church govern-
ance. Jansenism’s quasi-democratic defence of the priesthood against epis-
copal hierarchy and its legal/constitutional opposition to papal
interference in domestic matters was to inspire deeply the politics of reli-
gion. Ecclesiological restructuring, before , was profoundly
indebted to the reforms of enlightened absolutism. Rulers like Joseph II
had sought to privilege a utilitarian secular parish clergy against the
 V. Bindel, Histoire religieuse de Napoléon, Paris , i. –.
 C. Morris, The papal monarchy: the Western Church from  to , Oxford ,
–; P. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, London , –.
 J. H. Smith, The Great Schism, : the disintegration of the papacy, London ,
passim.
 D. van Kley, The religious origins of the French Revolution, London , esp. pp. –,
–.
 F. Oakley, The Conciliarist tradition: constitutionalism in the Catholic Church, –
, Oxford , –.
 A. Latreille, ‘Le Gallicanisme ecclésiastique sous le Premier Empire, vers le
Concile national de ’, Revue historique cxciv/ (), –.
 van Kley, Religious origins, –.
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redundant monasticism of the regular orders. Admittedly, such reforms
had witnessed widespread resistance and reaction. Yet their modernising
spirit was still present amongst an older generation of European clergy
born during the second half of the eighteenth century. Some currents
within Catholic enlightenment remained sympathetic to working in part-
nership with the state to renew the structures of both secular and ecclesias-
tical governance. This had been especially the case in the Grand Duchy
of Tuscany where Bishop Ricci’s Jansenist synod in Pistoia sought
such reform. Admittedly, it did, in the end, fail to achieve its goals
and Tuscan Giansenismo would never achieve such heights again.
Nevertheless, from the vantage point of the s it was far from clear
that Ultramontane thinking would triumph over neo-conciliarist and
regional traditions. For many, the ecclesiological rivers of the eighteenth
century had seemed to be ﬂowing in the opposite direction.
In France, the situation was further reinforced by centuries of powerful
localist traditions. Gallicanism, or the notion that the Church in France was
autonomous and that its bishops in council shared spiritual authority with
the pope, was a powerful legacy, which, although increasingly beleaguered,
strongly inﬂuenced clerical thinking throughout the nineteenth century.
The well-informed reminded the public that the decrees of the Council
of Trent had never been ratiﬁed fully in France. The most concrete
expression of this ecclesiological position can be observed in Bishop
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s famous four articles of the declaration of
. Essentially the French monarchy, and its Church, claimed admin-
istrative independence and immunity from excommunication. Bossuet’s
declaration was registered by the council of state after the annexation of
Rome in , and was made a mandatory part of the curriculum in sem-
inaries throughout the French Empire.
Gallicanism, as André Latreille reminds us, had always been a multifa-
ceted phenomenon, divided, for convenience, into three different
 D. Beales, Enlightenment and reform in eighteenth century Europe, London ,
–.
 J. Bradley and D. van Kley (eds), Religion and politics in Enlightenment Europe, Notre
Dame, IN , –; D. Sorkin, The religious Enlightenment, Princeton, NJ , –;
J. Burson and U. Lehner (eds), Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe, Notre Dame, IN
, –.
 C. A. Bolton, Church reform in th century Italy: the Synod of Pistoia, , The Hague
, passim; D. van Kley, ‘Catholic conciliar reform in an age of anti-Catholic
Revolution: France, Italy and the Netherlands, –’, in Bradley and van Kley,
Religion and politics, –.
 T. Crimando, ‘Two French views of the Council of Trent’, Sixteenth Century Journal
xix/ (), –.
 J. Bergin, Crown, Church and episcopate under Louis XIV, London , –.

‘Déclaration du Clergé de France de ’ [with registration in parlement], AN,
AF IV , dossier , no.  [?].  Latreille, ‘Le Gallicanisme’, .
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strands: monarchical, parlementaire and ecclesiastical. Napoleon was inter-
ested in the monarchical branch of this tradition, but the parlementaire
strand did re-emerge unexpectedly in . The emperor’s attachment
to the traditions of the Church of Gaul were to an extent opportunistic.
For example, the concordat of  can hardly be held up as a shining
example of French ecclesiological tradition. Indeed, the pope’s power
as supreme head of the Church was used to force the resignation of the sur-
viving bishops of the ancien régime Gallican establishment. A more
Ultramontane measure is hard to imagine. It was viewed as a crime by
the petite église which never forgave Pius VII for his betrayal.
Furthermore, those constitutional bishops who had sworn loyalty to the
French Revolution and its civil constitution had remained wary of the
Roman dimension of the Concordat. However the really unknown quan-
tity was the new generation of bishops created after  who had little or
no experience of the ancien régime or of a constitutional episcopate. The
emperor, as he admitted himself later on St Helena, had badly misjudged
the French clergy’s attachment to the traditions of Gallicanism. The
experience of revolution during the s had created younger curés
and bishops who placed their highest hopes and loyalties in Rome. An
imperial state, that had inherited the revolution’s non-denominational
nature and lukewarm appreciation of religion, remained suspect to them.
This article puts forward the view that the failure of the concile national
was not strategic, but tactical. A hefty minority of Napoleonic bishops
were frustrated with the pope’s recalcitrance and frightened by the
looming schism that threatened to plunge the Catholic Church back into
the bad old days of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Many of these
clergymen had experienced exile and persecution in their mature years
during the s. They knew the danger of schism, and wanted to avoid
it at all costs. Yet this same revolutionary crisis had given birth to a
younger generation, within the priesthood and the episcopate, that was
endowed with unprecedented Ultramontane sympathies. By  they
 Bernard Plongeron, ‘Face au Concordat , résistances des évêques anciens
constitutionnels’, Annales historiques de la Révolution française cccxxxvii (), –.
 Ibid. –.
 J.-E. Drochon, La Petite Eglise; essai historique sur le schisme anticoncordataire, Paris
, passim.
 The papal requirement that they retract their oath of  and recant previous
errors was never enforced by the Napoleonic authorities: Plongeron, ‘Face au
Concordat’, ; R. J. Dean, L’Eglise constitutionnelle, Napoléon et le Concordat de ,
Paris , –.

‘Il n’y a rien de Gallican dans le jeune clergé’ : E. de Las Cases (ed.), Le Mémorial de
Sainte-Hélène, London , iii. .
 T. Tackett, Religion, revolution, and regional culture in eighteenth-century France: the
ecclesiastical oath of , Princeton, NJ , passim.
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were different from their ancien régime and constitutional church colleagues
in outlook and expectations.With the legitimate king in exile and church
properties permanently conﬁscated as national lands, there was little hope
that the ‘real’ Gallicanism of the past could ever be resurrected.
The abbés Lamennais (Jean, brother to the more famous Hugues),
Astros, Perreau, Dauchet and many others, linked to the anti-imperial che-
valiers de la foi conspiracy, were distinctly un-nostalgic. They were radicals,
who wanted a much more powerful and reformed Church to be built on
the ruins of Gallicanism. In this they were natural allies of the papacy,
and during the Restorationmade some important contributions to political
thought. That said, Gallicanism did not die with the empire: the abbé
Denis-Luc Frayssinous, who was the secretary to the concile national of
, and the later rector of the Restoration university, did his best, with
a neo-Gallican clique, to rejuvenate French ecclesiastical traditions.
The battle between Gallican and Ultramontane ecclesiology would con-
tinue right up to the  revolutions and beyond.
At the heart of the crisis of  were those twenty-six dioceses that had
been left ‘widowed’ of their bishops. None of the emperor’s incumbents
could ofﬁcially take possession of their sees as they lacked papal investi-
ture. The interim expedient used to solve this crisis was to force cathedral
chapters to elect episcopal nominees as capitular vicars-general. This
meant that, although not canonically bishops, Napoleon’s candidates
could administer their dioceses legitimately with the approval of the
chapter. This device was at ﬁrst trialed in the dioceses of Paris, Asti and
Florence. However, with the help of an anti-imperial network of clergymen,
the pope managed to contact clandestinely the chapters of these cathedral
cities and to urged their canons to resist the French-born évêques intrus.
This wide network, which extended from Savona to Turin to Paris, via
Lyons, came to light in December . It demonstrated that not only
 Bindel, Histoire religieuse de Napoléon, i, chs iv, ix.
 G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand de Bertier et l’énigme de la Congrégation,
Paris , –.
 C. Armenteros, ‘Hugues-Félicité de Lamennais, lost sheep of the religious
Enlightenment’, in Burson and Lehner, Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe, –.
 A. Roquette, Monseigneur Frayssinous, grand-maître de l’université sous la Restauration,
–, Paris , –.
 A. Gough, Paris and Rome: the Gallican Church and the Ultramontane campaign, –
, Oxford , esp. pp. –.
 Félix Julien Bigot de Préameneu to Napoleon, n.d., AN, AF IV , dossier ,
no. .
 The immediate solution had been to return to Bourbon precedent. During the
régale crisis of  to , Rome had similarly refused to conﬁrm Louis XIV’s candi-
dates to the episcopacy: Bergin, Crown, Church and episcopate, –; ‘Aperçu de la con-
duite tenu par les Empereurs et Rois lorsque les Papes se sont mal conduits’, AN, AF IV
, dossier , no. .  ‘Rapport à SM sur l’affaire d’Astros’, ibid. dossier .
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clergy but also some senior lay administrators in the Napoleonic Empire
had joined this conspiracy to resist the emperor’s clumsy attempts to
short-circuit the papacy’s powers of appointment.
The empire’s legislators were forced to seek other solutions. Two eccle-
siastical conseils met in late  and early  charged with advising the
council of state on the most effective means of resolving the episcopal
stand-off. The most loyal bishops and theologians of the empire, headed
by Cardinal Fesch, met to search for a solution. Three series of question-
naires on the governance of the Church during the present crisis were
issued and provided the agenda for discussion. Most preferred a nego-
tiated settlement with the imprisoned pope. They proposed that a delega-
tion be sent to Savona to discuss terms. For Pius, the release of the college
of cardinals and his return to Rome were the sine qua non for future nego-
tiation. Yet the government was concerned about what would happen if
the pope continued to resist conciliation.
The ﬁnal recourse open to the emperor and his administrators was neo-
conciliarism, an instrument which might well back-ﬁre. The use of a
council to arbitrate on questions of church governance did not necessarily
guarantee the desired outcome. As the emperor knew only too well from
his own experience with the tribunate, deliberative assemblies could be very
unpredictable. The conseil was lukewarm when it came to consider this
option and recommended that it be used only in the most extreme ‘case
of necessity’. The Gallican abbé Jacques-André Émery, the head of the semin-
ary of Saint-Sulpice, advised caution. For him, recognition of the independ-
ence of the French Church, in terms of its internal organisation, did not
invalidate the pope’s authority as the visible head of the universal Church.
Before delivering its ﬁnal report, the conseil ecclésiastique met with the
emperor in person on  March . It was decided that an attempt
would be made to persuade the pope to accept a negotiated settlement
by sending to Savona a hand-picked delegation, comprising the archbishop
of Tours and the bishops of Trier and Nantes. They would offer the pope
 P. Droulers, ‘Abbé d’Astros et l’expérience religieuse du Premier Empire’,
Gregorianum xxix/ (), –.

‘Rapport de la Commission sur les réponses des évêques’, AN, AF IV , dossier
, no. .  Savona deputation, AN, AF IV , dossier , nos –.

‘Rapport du voyage des evêques auprès du pape’, ibid. no. .
 B. Tierney, Foundations of the conciliar theory, Cambridge , passim; A. J. Black,
‘What was conciliarism?’, in B. Tierney and P. Linehan (eds), Authority and power,
Cambridge , –.
 I. Collins, Napoleon and his parliaments, –, London , –.
 J. E. A. Gosselin, Vie de M. Émerys, Paris , ii. –.
 Haussonville, L’Église romaine et le Premier Empire, iv. –, –; D. Dufour de
Pradt, Les Quatres Concordats, Paris , ii. .
 Haussonville, L’Église romaine et le Premier Empire, iv. –.
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the option of residing in Rome but he would have to swear allegiance to the
French empire. Failing that he would live in either Avignon or Paris under
imperial supervision. The pope would be guaranteed external communica-
tion through an independent diplomatic corps accredited to him. The real
bottom line was that imperial nominees to sees should receive canonical
investiture within six months.
The imperial government had expected that the threat of a concile national
meeting in Paris would induce the pope to make concessions. In April 
all the bishops of the French empire, of the kingdom of Italy and Karl
Theodor von Dalberg, prince-primate of Regensburg, were summoned to
Paris. The intention was that an assembly of the bishops of the imperial
Church could circumvent papal authority and sanction canonical investi-
ture by metropolitan archbishops (or in their absence the senior bishop
of the province). Although superﬁcially simple, this plan rapidly ran into
difﬁculties. The three deputy bishops returned from Savona with a note,
dated May, which they claimed had the pope’s sanction. It comprised
four articles which accepted the metropolitans’ right to invest new bishops
within six months of nomination. Within forty-eight hours, the pope’s con-
science caused him to disavow the note and retracted the last two articles.
From a legal standpoint, the note was unsigned and thus valueless.
Failing to make progress in the negotiations in Savona, the imperial gov-
ernment staged a publicity campaign clothing their struggle against the
pope in Gallican colours. No previous studies have noted how the aca-
demic elite of the Empire rallied behind the concile national of  and
tried to provide the emperor with potent intellectual and ecclesiological
ammunition. Of vital importance in this operation to win over the public
sphere was Pierre Daunou who, in , published his far from innocent
La Puissance temporelle des papes et l’abus qu’ils ont fait de leur ministère spiri-
tuel. Daunou was a former Oratorian teaching brother and a
Brumairian who knew his church history well. After a tempestuous term
as president of the tribunate, he had been moved to the directorship of
the imperial archives. Here he was in the perfect position to strengthen
the regime’s anti-papal ideology with historical material.

‘Rapport du voyage des evêques auprès du pape’, AN, AF IV , dossier ,
no. .
 Rossetti, Giornale ossia, –; ASMi, Culto PM , dossier  circolari.
 L. M. J. de Barral, Fragments relatifs à l’histoire ecclésiastique des premières années du dix-
neuvième siècle, Paris , –.
 Napoleon to Eugène de Beauharnais (his stepson and viceroy of Italy), Paris, 
mars , Napoléon Bonaparte: correspondance générale, ix, no.  at p. ; propa-
ganda, AN, AF IV , dossier , nos –.
 P. Daunou, La Puissance temporelle des papes, et l’abus qu’ils ont fait de leur ministère
spiritual, Paris , .
 G. Minart, Pierre Daunou, l’anti-Robespierre, Toulouse , –.
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Daunou and his team in the archives were behind a wide variety of
learned reports and historical treatises that allowed the emperor to legitim-
ise the concile. These reports equally betrayed the regime’s debt to the
French enlightenment as they quoted bountifully from sceptical histories
written by the abbé Claude Fleury and by Voltaire. The historical research
undertaken by the imperial archivists and auditeurs du conseil was prodi-
gious, but what it possessed in mass it lacked in structure and consistency.
It skipped from one historical example to another and the arguments as to
why precedents, shrouded in millennial mists, should guide early
nineteenth-century practices were nebulous. Ultimately, the empire’s
fall-back position was that, if the pope and concile failed to solve the inves-
titure crisis, a return to the pragmatic sanction of Bourges of  was
inevitable.
It was when it came to ‘managing’ the bishops gathered in Paris that the
imperial regime made several fatal diplomatic blunders. The ﬁrst problem
was that the congregation of bishops summoned to Paris was not ecumen-
ical, as not every Catholic bishop was invited to attend. Similarly, it could
not be described properly as ‘national’ since it included Belgian, Italian
and two German bishops. The ill-deﬁned and unprecedented nature of
this assembly meant that it would always be vulnerable to questions of com-
petence and legitimacy. The second major issue was one of timing. The
emperor wanted everything resolved in a matter of weeks. Such haste was
unlikely, especially as the Council of Trent, the last great ecumenical
council of the Church prior to , had taken eighteen years to promul-
gate its decrees. Even the Council of Embrun of , the last provincial
meeting of the Gallican Church, which had condemned the writings of
Jean Soanen, took four months to reach its foregone conclusion.
Within ﬁve weeks Napoleon would dissolve his own concile national. Such
high-handed treatment quickly sapped any residual Gallican sympathies
for his reform programme.
When the bishops arrived in Paris, Cardinal Fesch hosted some prelim-
inary conferences at his residence in the rue du Mont-Blanc. These discus-
sions concentrated on relatively uncontentious matters, like who should

‘de l’exercice des droits du pape et des souverains relativement aux conciles’, 
mai , AN, AF IV , dossier , unnumbered; anon., Cérémonial du Concile National
de Paris tenu l’an , Paris , –.

‘Aperçu de la conduite tenu par les empereurs et rois lorsque les papes se sont mal
conduits’, AN, AF IV , dossier , no. .

‘de l’exercice des droits du pape et des souverains relativement aux conciles’, 
mai , AN, AF IV , dossier , unnumbered.

‘Daunou’s report on concile’, ibid. no. , fo. ; N. Valois, Histoire de la
Pragmatique Sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII, Paris , passim.
 R. Po-Chia Hsia, The world of Catholic renewal, –, Cambridge , –.
 J. Carreyre, Le Concile d’Embrun, –, Bordeaux , esp. pp. –.
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assume the presidency of proceedings and questions of procedure and
ceremony. Fesch, as both Napoleon’s uncle and primate of Gaul, was the
most senior prelate of the empire and ex-ofﬁcio president. From these
early discussions an ecclesiastical fronde had started to coalesce around
the archbishop of Bordeaux and the bishops of Ghent, Troyes and
Tournai. They articulated a determination not to rubber-stamp passively
the emperor’s plans to have bishops conﬁrmed without papal approval.
The main protagonist in this affair was Maurice de Broglie, bishop of
Ghent, whose journal, published by Haussonville in , provides the
most detailed account of opposition within the concile. This bishop was
the scion of an ancien régime princely family and personiﬁed Napoleon’s
policy of administrative amalgame, of combining, that is, the winners and
losers of the Revolution into a composite elite for the empire. Yet
the example of de Broglie demonstrated the regime’s limited success in
rallying old elites to its standard. In  he declined promotion within
the légion d’honneur in protest against the annexation of Rome, and was dis-
missed from his post as one of the emperor’s chaplains.
Those who opposed the concile’s reform programme and those who
enthusiastically espoused a neo-conciliarist solution were two important
factions, but neither could command a majority within the concile. Most
bishops were moderates, who hoped that the council would present an
opportunity for discussion, and that a new concordat might result. 
June  saw the state opening of the corps législatif. It was traditional
for a speech to be given from the throne outlining the legislative pro-
gramme for the session. The emperor’s radical plans for the papacy were
discussed with little in the way of tact:
The affairs of religion have all too often been caught up in and sacriﬁced to the
interests of a third-rate minor power. If half of Europe has separated itself from
the Church of Rome, one can attribute this to the contradiction which has
always existed between the truth and principles of religion, which are universally
valid, against the particular claims and interests that concern a mere corner of
Italy. I have put an end to this scandal forever. I have reunited Rome to the
Empire. I have given the popes palaces in both Rome and Paris. If they have the
interests of religion at heart they will come and reside at the centre of the affairs
of Christianity, in the same way as St Peter preferred Rome to the Holy Land.
 Ricard, Le Concile National de , –.
 J. Lenfant, ‘Maurice de Broglie, évêque de Gand, –’, Revue d’histoire de
l’Église de France xvii/ (), –.
 S. Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe, London , –.
 Lenfant, ‘Maurice de Broglie’, .
 J. Madival and E. Laurent (eds), Archives parlementaires, –, Paris ,
xi. .
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This speech antagonised the bishops before the opening ceremony had
even taken place.
On  June  the concile national began with a solemn procession and
mass at Notre Dame. The sermon preached by Étienne-Marie de Boulogne,
bishop of Troyes, offered a reassuringly Gallican preamble, but also
reafﬁrmed absolute loyalty to the papacy. Equally, Cardinal Fesch’s deci-
sion to have a roll call in the course of which each bishop swore allegiance
to the pope, as prescribed by the canons of the Council of Trent, was seen
as inappropriate by the emperor. The most vexed question surrounded
the status of those bishops who had been nominated to sees but had not
received papal conﬁrmation. When taking his oath, the bishop of Troyes
dismissed these nominees as ‘those, whose very presence is already a
scandal in their dioceses’. Despite such opposition, they could attend
the concile with a consultative voice but no voting rights.
On  June Félix-Julien-Jean Bigot de Préameneu, as minister of reli-
gious affairs, addressed the bishops and presented them with the emper-
or’s instructions and agenda for deliberation. This speech was essentially
an indictment of the policies of the Roman curia since . It had been
ghost-written by Daunou and revised by Fesch. Its disrespectful tone
towards the papacy, accusing the mild-mannered, and captive, Pius VII of
being a reincarnation of the worst excesses of the Gregorys and
Bonifaces of medieval obscurantism, was misguided at best. Equally the
accusation that the Rome curia sought to excite the fanaticism of a new
generation of regicides, following in the footsteps of Ravaillac and
Damiens, was hyperbolic. The possibilist attitude of many bishops meta-
morphosed into irritation within the space of just four days. This unin-
tended outcome highlighted the perils of neo-conciliarism. If the bishops
had been handled with greater tact, and been given more time, their atti-
tude to the concile might well have been very different
Between  June and  July the bishops essentially debated the question
of how to respond to Napoleon’s agenda and whether, as a body, they were
competent to adjudicate on the question of investiture. Initially a commis-
sion charged with responding to the imperial address was elected. It com-
prised the archbishops of Ravenna, Tours and Turin and the bishops of
Nantes, Troyes, Ghent and Evreux. As the work of the abbé Ricard
shows, the papal and imperial factions were evenly balanced. The
Gallican theologian Jean-Baptiste Duvoisin, bishop of Nantes, tried to
carry forward the empire’s agenda by reading a pre-prepared statement
 Report from Bigot to the emperor on ecclesiastical oath, AN, AF IV , dossier
, nos –; J.-P. Lyonnet, Le Cardinal Fesch, archevêque de Lyon, Paris .
 H. Welschinger, Le Pape et l’empereur, –, Paris , .
 Imperial address, AN, AF IV , dossier , no. .
 Ricard, Le Concile National de , –.
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which expressed gratitude to Napoleon for convening the council and
declared the pope’s excommunication of the emperor nulliﬁed by the
four articles of the Gallican Church. The bishop of Ghent objected strenu-
ously to the content of this response and defended the prerogatives of the
Holy See. The retort that Duivoisin’s text had already been approved by
Napoleon only made matters worse.
A redrafted version of Duvoisin’s reply to the emperor’s address was
debated in three general congregations towards the end of June. The arch-
bishop of Bordeaux reafﬁrmed that the canons of the Council of Trent
entitled the pope unequivocally to excommunicate sovereigns. He
declared: ‘condemn the pope if you dare and condemn the Church if
you can!’ The commission made no more progress in reaching a reso-
lution than ecclesiastical conseils of the previous two years had done. Like
the conseils, several bishops demanded that their response to the
emperor must contain the humble appeal that the pope be released
from Savona and brought to the concile. The emperor was aware of the
growing ecclesiastical fronde and, on  June, refused to receive a deputa-
tion from the concile.
The early weeks of July saw a new commission appointed to discuss two
fundamental questions: Was the concile competent to decide the issue of
investiture? If so, could it provisionally conﬁrm the appointment of the
nominated bishops? This new committee comprised Cardinals Carlo
Francesco Caselli and Giuseppe Maria Spina (mistakenly believed to be
pro-imperial moderates), the archbishops of Bordeaux and Tours, and
the bishops of Nantes, Comacchio, Ivrea, Tournai, Trier and Ghent.
Louis-Mathias de Barral, the Gallican archbishop of Tours, tried a
change in tactics. He revealed the outcome of his mission to Savona in
May. He did bend the truth by stating that the pope was in principle,
with some reservations, in favour of the four articles which been drafted
in his presence. This revelation backﬁred as many argued that if the
pope was in agreement then surely there was no ‘case of extreme necessity’,
no need for emergency measures to invest new bishops. Consequently, the
pope should be asked to send the necessary bulls to conﬁrm the emperor’s
candidates. Several ballots were taken on the question of whether the
concile was competent to decide the investiture issue, and a majority
against emerged.
On  July Fesch travelled to Saint Cloud to give the emperor news of this
signiﬁcant reverse. The neo-conciliarist solution, instead of rallying and
 Haussonville, L’Église romaine et le Premier Empire, iv. –; ‘Esprit du Concile’
(police reports on the bishops), AN, AF IV , dossier , nos –.
 Haussonville, L’Église romaine et le Premier Empire, iv. .

‘Note on committee’, St Cloud, juillet , AN, AF IV , dossier , no. .

‘Esprit du Concile’, ibid. nos –.  Lyonnet, Le Cardinal Fesch, ii. .
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resurrecting the Gallican Church on the contrary emphasised the strength
of Ultramontane feeling. The emperor expressed his dissatisfaction and
threatened to arrest any metropolitan archbishop who would not bestow
canonical investiture on an imperial candidate. A last ditch attempt was
made to save the situation and Napoleon dictated a draft set of decrees
to be approved by the bishops.
Those bishops who were active in the ecclesiastical frondemade it known
that if this decree was approved, they would return to the question of com-
petency. Fesch, yet again, was summoned by his nephew and asked to
identify the key troublemakers. The bishops of the satellite kingdom of
Italy were native Italians, unlike their colleagues in the départements
réunies of Piedmont, Parma and Tuscany which were ruled directly from
Paris and had French-born bishops. The canonico Rossetti’s diary
alleges that the episcopate of the Italian kingdom was singled out by the
emperor for effusive praise. These prelates, who had little native tradition
of Gallicanism, proved muchmore amenable to the imperial will than their
French counterparts, who considered themselves as champions of the
Ultramontane cause. Why the Italian episcopate of the satellite
kingdom proved more docile than those born in France is hard to
fathom. One could speculate that not having experienced a native revolu-
tion they did not appreciate fully the dangers of a schism. Perhaps the
Giansenismo of several leading Italian seminaries made some of the older
bishops more sympathetic to curbing papal power.
Given the increasing problems in making progress with the concile’s
agenda, Fesch was asked to name the principal opponents of the reform
programme. Under pressure he was forced to identify the bishops of
Ghent, Tournai and Troyes as the principal culprits. They were arrested
at three that very morning and would spend the next three years either
in fortresses or internal exile. These arrests were a harbinger for the dis-
solution (suspension would be more accurate) of the concile on  July
. All the bishops were told to remain in Paris awaiting further
orders. An interregnum of three weeks ensued, during which a streamlined
version of neo-conciliarism, that left no hostages to fortune, was choreo-
graphed behind the scenes.
The most forgotten aspect of  was the brief re-emergence of parle-
mentaire Gallicanism. The council of state appointed a special commission
of experts to explore legal remedies and apply pressure on the episcopate
to solve the investiture crisis. It was presided over by Régnier, as minister of
 Haussonville, L’Église romaine et le Premier Empire, iv. .  Ibid. iv. –.
 ASMi, Culto PM , dossier , concili e sinodi.
 Rossetti, Giornale ossia, –, esp p. .
 van Kley, ‘Catholic conciliar reform’, passim.
 J.-O. Boudon, Napoléon et les cultes, Paris , –, –.
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justice, and included some of the most famous jurists of the empire: Jean-
Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès, Bigot, Michel Regnaud de Saint-Jean
d’Angély and Achille Libéral Treilhard. Many of these men had been
close to the Jansenist avocats of the parlement of Paris who had resisted
the papal bull Unigenitus with great vigour throughout the eighteenth
century. From this older generation of lawyers they had inherited a
disdain for any intrusion by Rome into French affairs. They were eager
to protect Gallicanism from papal interference. In this goal they had a
keen ally in the Voltairian, and anti-clerical minister of police, Anne Jean
Savary duc de Rovigo. He had been a key ﬁgure in the repression of
secret networks of Ultramontane clergy, and had overseen the interroga-
tion and arrests of the three bishops who had challenged the emperor’s
intentions during the concile. In many ways these men were the ideologues
of Napoleon’s ‘War against God’.
The work of this commission has been ignored by historians, although its
ﬁndings were truly remarkable for an imperial regime that was so invested
in legislative innovation. Its jurists agreed that a metropolitan archbishop
could invest new bishops, and that this could be done with the approval of
the concile. For the commission, the most important question was what to do
if archbishops refused to comply. Under the ancien régime their revenues
could be withheld and their properties conﬁscated. However, as church
lands had been nationalised in  this remedy was unlikely to be sufﬁ-
ciently intimidating.
The commission lamented the fact that modern legal codes made no
provision for the old legal instrument of the appel comme d’abus. Under
this procedure, during the ancien régime, appeals against ecclesiastical deci-
sions could be brought to secular courts of appeal, like the old parlements.
Here, clerical rulings or actions could be overturned. This instrument was
used against clergy who exceeded the boundaries of their jurisdiction and
intruded into the realms of the secular. The commission proposed its
reintegration into imperial law and thus gave judges a potent weapon
against rogue archbishops. Their suggestion that parlementaire
Gallicanism be resurrected was decidedly unexpected. Régnier argued

‘Rapports de la commission sur les réponses des évêques’, AN, AF IV , dossier
, no. .
 D. Bell, Lawyers and citizens: the making of a political elite in old regime France, Oxford
, –.  T. Lentz, Savary, le Séide de Napoléon, Paris , –.
 M. Broers, The Napoleonic Mediterranean: Enlightenment, revolution and empire,
London , esp. pt II; T. Lentz and G. Bernard (eds), Napoléon et le droit, Paris
, esp. Guillaume Bernard, ‘Le Droit dynastique napoléonien: entre enracinement
historique et innovation politique’, at pp. –; Marc Bouvet, ‘Le Conseil d’État
napoléonien, juge administratif suprême sous l’Empire’, at pp. –; and Xavier
Martin ‘L’Implication de Bonaparte dans l’éclosion du Code Civil’, at pp. –.
 R. Génestal, Les Origines de l’appel comme d’abus, Paris , passim.
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that articles six and seven of the organic laws of the Concordat (which the
papacy had never accepted) had allowed for allegations of clerical abuse of
power to be judged by the council of state. They advised that the emperor
could transfer the council’s jurisdiction over the clergy to the imperial
courts of justice. Thus, metropolitans refusing to invest candidates could
be tried through an appel comme d’abus as criminally negligent in the exer-
cise of their duties and indicted accordingly. Imperial prosecutors any-
where in the empire could thus pursue any metropolitan who did not
invest nominees. It was a safe assumption that Savary’s police force would
vigorously enforce this anti-clerical legislation.
The appel comme d’abus inhabited the porous and permeable boundaries
of the ancien regime’s alliance of Throne and Altar. Imperial France had
claimed supremacy over all religions and did not recognise an autonomous
religious jurisdiction that operated in parallel with that of the state. Even
considering resurrecting such an arcane instrument of parlementaire consti-
tutionalism was paradoxical and highlighted the limits of neo-conciliarism.
The draft decree that would have re-established and incorporated the appel
comme d’abus into law was impressive in its menace. By early August 
the decree was at an advanced stage in the drafting process and came
close to promulgation.
Although there is no surviving evidence, it seems plausible that Savary and
theministry of police leaked these draft decrees to the prelates in Paris, thus
heightening their fears of arrest. Whatever the case may be, episcopal
resolve melted away during the second half of July . The turning-
point came when all bishops in Paris were invited to theministry of religious
affairs and presented with a draft decree containing ﬁve articles.
Essentially these returned to notions that the Church in France was autono-
mous and after six months metropolitans could invest their own bishops.
The only concession was article ﬁve, that made provision for an enlarged
deputation to be sent to Savona to seek papal sanction. Bigot, as the
Frenchminister of religious affairs, and Giovanni Bovara as his Italian coun-
terpart, spent many days trying to persuade the bishops in Paris to accept
this draft decree in writing. The letter of adherence drafted by Cardinal
Étienne Hubert Cambaceres, archbishop of Rouen, served as the template
to which the vast majority of bishops signed their name.

‘Rapport de la commission présidée par S.E. le Grand Juge et chargée de proposer
un projet touchant l’institution canonique des évêques’, AN, AF IV , dossier ,
no. .  ‘Projet de loi’, ibid.  van Kley, Religious origins, –.
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dossier , no. .  Draft decree, ibid. no. .  Ibid.
 C. Ledré, ‘Un Archevêque français au concile de ’, Revue d’histoire de l’Église de
France xxxii/ (), –.
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On  July Bigot tallied votes for and against. To his satisfaction eighty-
ﬁve bishops were favourable, while thirteen still opposed the decree. Ten
days later, the concile was reconvened for a pre-orchestrated ﬁnal general
congregation in which nothing was left to chance. During the closing
session, Bigot and Bovara steered the bishops successfully towards a
formal ratiﬁcation of the decree. The imperial government had achieved
its objective, yet it could not hide the fact that the concile’s favourable
verdict was the outcome of physical coercion and psychological intimida-
tion. The enlarged deputation mandated by the decrees comprised the
usual storm-troopers of Gallicanism and was expanded to include
Cardinals Aurelio Roverella, Fabrizio Ruffo, Alphonse de Bayanne and
Antonio Dugnani who headed for Savona. They would negotiate with
the pope from September until January .
Success seemed to follow in the wake of this delegation when on 
September a draft papal brief arrived in Paris that accepted the decrees
of the concile. It was worded delicately, as it made no reference to the
imperial government and seemed to imply that the concile had been sum-
moned by the pope motu proprio. This was unacceptable to the imperial
authorities, and in the following months attempts were made to revise the
brief. The pope reiterated his demands that he be released, and refused to
accept that imperial appointments extend to the Suburbicarian sees of the
province of Rome. The French had abolished and amalgamated a
number of these dioceses, so their return to papal control was impossible
in practice. The failure of the concile national seemed conﬁrmed when, in
February , the pope, though gravely ill, was transferred from Savona
to Fontainebleau amidst security concerns and the need to isolate him
further.
Such a conclusion would be hasty, however, as throughout  and
early  negotiations between Napoleon and the pope continued.
They would culminate in the Concordat of Fontainebleau, signed by Pius
VII on  January . Its provisions were profoundly inspired by the
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decrees of the concile national of , and the inﬂuence of Jansenism was
implicit throughout its articles. This new concordat (subsequently repu-
diated by Pius) would have created a Catholic Church that accepted the
supremacy of the empire and would have given the clergy a new utilitarian
mission. The vicissitudes, and eventual retraction, of this concordat are
beyond the scope of this article. For the moment it was the key point at
which Napoleon’s policy of neo-conciliarism had seemed to triumph
over Ultramontane resistance.
The story of the concile national of  is a vital one in understanding the
religious policies of the Napoleonic Empire and, to an extent, the develop-
ment of papal monarchy in the early nineteenth century. It was muchmore
than just a tale of good versus evil, as several nineteenth-century ecclesias-
tical historians claimed. The empire’s gross mismanagement of this
church council backﬁred in unintended and deeply damaging ways. The
eighteenth century had witnessed much ecclesiological ferment. Gallican
and Jansenist activists had shown that there was some hunger within the
Church to work in partnership with the state to push forward a shared pro-
gramme of enlightened modernisation. During negotiations for the
concordat, and throughout the empire, Napoleon appealed to these
instincts which, decades before, had proved so compelling for this older
generation of bishops. Many prelates had been willing to give him the
beneﬁt of the doubt when he came to power in . The concile national
of  shattered any residual illusions. The brutal reality of an empire
determined to control all aspects of religious life was laid bare and the mis-
management of the concile rekindled the deep mutual distrust which had
pitted Church against State since . One could speculate that the
concile contributed to the toxiﬁcation of Gallicanism and neo-conciliarism
for future generations of French priests and Catholics. The French
Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire certainly made an important con-
tribution to making ‘God’ and ‘political modernity’ increasingly uncom-
fortable bedfellows.
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